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Abstract 
Individual decision making under risk is the key component of any economic 
activity, especially in transition economies where people are confronted with various 
risks and uncertainties in situations of private and public choice, which have never been 
experienced before. Such choices are typically irreversible and taken under time 
constraints.  
This paper provides experimental evidence of the existence of content-
dependent preferences in individual choice under risk. The heuristic of relative 
probability comparisons suggests that individuals choose the lottery, which is most 
likely to outperform all other feasible lotteries. This heuristic is ordinal in outcomes, 
which makes it a simple and plausible decision procedure. However, the heuristic can 
lead not only to a significant bias when choosing between two yields of equal 
performance but also to intransitive preferences in their ranking of alternative decisions. 
The experimental results demonstrate the following prediction: in some choice 
situations the majority of decision making agents indeed uses the heuristic of relative 
probability comparisons, and in consequence, around 55% of them violate transitivity 
and 65% violate weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP).  
The most important contribution of this paper is the experimental documentation 
of a very high incidence of asymmetric intransitive preferences. These preferences can 
be rationalized as the content-dependent preferences induced by the use of the heuristic 
of relative probability comparisons. 
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Content-dependent Preferences in Choice under Risk: 
Heuristic of Relative Probability Comparisons 
Pavlo Blavatskyy 
1. Introduction 
 
“Deriving the axioms from the natural process used by people rather than 
using artificial axioms is a more promising strategy for constructing a 
descriptive theory.” (Rubinstein 1988, p. 146) 
 
Individual preferences are content-dependent if: 
1) preference between two particular options depends on other available alternatives 
(the content of a choice set), or 
2) the addition or deletion of irrelevant alternatives can cause a preference reversal, 
or 
3) the preferences are contingent on a choice set.  
The above three definitions are equivalent. The third definition stresses that different choice 
sets can generate different indifference curves and utility functions defined over the same 
common elements. Therefore, rational choice can be intransitive and violate a weak axiom of 
revealed preferences (WARP). This paper considers the decisions of individuals with content-
dependent preferences in choice under risk. 
The existing decision theories assume that individual preferences over lotteries are 
either absolute or relative. When evaluating a lottery, an individual with absolute preferences 
focuses only on its specific characteristics while the payoff distribution of other available 
lotteries is ignored. Such an individual compares different lotteries on the universal utility 
scale irrespective of the context of choice situation. A decision theory, which assumes 
absolute preferences, specifies a mapping from the elements of a lottery space into the real 
numbers. The primary example of such theories is expected utility theory.  
When evaluating a lottery, an individual with relative preferences focuses on its 
relative characteristics—how distinct it is from other feasible lotteries. Such an individual 
compares different lotteries only in the context of the choice situation, i.e., when the 
information about all available alternatives is known. A decision theory, which assumes 
relative preferences, specifies a mapping from the elements of a choice set into the real 
numbers. In general each element of the lottery space can be mapped to different numerical 
values if this lottery is viewed as the element of different choice sets.  
The individual with absolute preferences never needs to reevaluate a lottery once this 
task was done in the past. The individual with relative preferences reevaluates the lottery each 
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time when the choice set changes. Such an individual evaluates a lottery by differences 
between its probability distribution and the probability distributions of other feasible lotteries. 
Generally, the individual with relative preferences can use two discriminating cues—how 
distinct lottery outcomes are and how distinct lottery probabilities are. 
Some examples of theories assuming relative individual preference are regret theory 
(Loomes and Sugden 1982) and similarity theory (Rubinstein 1988). Both theories invoke 
comparisons between lotteries already in the evaluation stage. For example, regret theory 
compares the realized outcome of a chosen lottery with the realized outcomes of the lotteries 
that might have been chosen instead. In this sense regret theory is based on relative 
preferences. In contrast, disappointment theory (Bell 1985) compares the realized outcome of 
a chosen lottery with the unrealized outcomes of the chosen lottery that might have appeared 
instead. Thus, disappointment theory is based on absolute preferences. 
This paper investigates another decision making mechanism leading to relative 
preferences over lotteries. The heuristic of relative probability comparisons creates a 
particular type of content-dependent preferences when an individual evaluates a lottery by its 
probability to outperform all other available lotteries. In a joint distribution of all feasible 
lotteries, an individual estimates the probability of a lottery to yield an undominated outcome. 
Technically, a decision maker estimates the ex ante probability of a lottery to bring the 
highest ex post outcome (among the ex post outcomes of all feasible lotteries). Then an 
individual compares the relative probabilities of each lottery winning over the others, which 
explains the term the heuristic of relative probability comparisons, and chooses the lottery 
with the highest such probability. The heuristic of relative probability comparisons is ordinal 
in outcomes, which increases its attraction in choice under risk when only ordinal information 
about lottery outcomes is available. The heuristic is also plausible when the individuals 
choose to process cardinal information about lottery outcomes in an ordinal way for 
simplicity.  
To describe this decision procedure, Blyth (1972) introduced the criterion of 
maximum likelihood to be the greatest and Bar-Hillel and Margalit (1988) introduced the 
notion of probabilistic prevalence of one lottery over the other. Blyth (1972) constructed 
explicit examples where the application of his criterion leads to intransitivity and violation of 
WARP in choice under risk. Bar-Hillel and Margalit (1988) argued that Blyth’s paradoxes are 
psychologically implausible (with the exception of some competitive situations). However, 
the experimental evidence reported here challenges this argument. Although it is difficult to 
assess directly which heuristic the subjects use in the experiment, I construct an example in 
which the subjects reveal the use of the heuristic of relative probability comparisons by their 
choice functions. 
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the design, 
implementation and results of the experiment on decision-making. Section 3 analyzes the 
choice situations employed in the experiment. Specifically, this section demonstrates that the 
obtained experimental results can be explained by the use of the heuristic of relative 
probability comparisons by the majority of the subjects. Section 4 discusses the relevant 
literature. Section 5 concludes the discussion. 
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2. The Apple-tree Experiment 
The individual with content-dependent preferences evaluates each element of the 
choice set relatively to the other available alternatives. A relative preference ordering (like the 
one deduced from the heuristic of relative probability comparisons) can lead to intransitive 
choice and violation of WARP. The following example exploits this possibility. Specifically, 
choice situations are constructed where the use of the heuristic of relative probability 
comparisons leads an individual to an intransitive choice in violation of WARP. Thus, the 
content-dependent preferences can easily be detected experimentally.  
 
 
The choice set consists of three apple-trees: A, B and C. Apple-tree A produces either 
2 apples with probability 32  or 5 apples with probability 31 . The annual apple-crop of tree 
B is always 3 apples
1
. Apple-tree C yields either 4 apples with probability 32  or 1 apple with 
probability 31 . Obviously, the expected apple crop of every tree is 3 apples (Figure 1). If the 
individuals cared only about the expected payoffs, they should be indifferent between the 
proposed apple-trees, and there will be no systematic pattern in their choice decisions. This 
apple-tree triple is very similar to the three independent random variables constructed by 
Blyth (1972) to illustrate his non-transitivity paradox. Anand (1993) used the same lotteries as 
the above apple-trees for the illustration of a dice game where a rational individual has 
intransitive preferences. However, it appears that no one used this lottery triple outside 
thought experiments on rationalizing intransitive choice. 
To assess the empirical foundations of the heuristic of relative probability 
comparisons an experiment is conducted where the subjects are asked to reveal their choice in 
the following four situations:  
1) choice between apple-tree A and B,  
2) choice between apple-tree B and C,  
3) choice between apple-tree A and C, and 
4) choice among apple-trees A, B and C.  
                                                 
1 Starmer and Sugden (1998) found that the presence of a riskless lottery (sure thing) in a choice triple 
increases the likelihood of observing intransitive preferences. Therefore, I use apple-tree B which 
always produces the same apple crop. 
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Hoffrage et al. (2002) showed that a representation by natural frequencies facilitates 
individual decision making under risk. Therefore, in the experiment the subjects were 
presented with the apple-trees without the explicit use of the word “probability”
2
. The joint 
distribution of lotteries was derived from the assumption that lotteries are independent.  
The experiment was conducted in six classroom sessions (Table 1 presents the 
characteristics of each subject group). The subjects were asked to fill in the questionnaire 
(Appendix I) and were not paid for their participation. The experiment lasted approximately 
15 minutes. 
Table 2 presents the results of the experiment for each subject group and a pooled 
result for groups 2, 3 and 6 that were similar in age and mathematical training. Theoretically 
we can observe up to 24 distinct choice patterns in the experiment. It turned out that 5 choice 
patterns were never chosen by any of the 411 subjects. Another 12 choice patterns were 
chosen by less than 1% of the subject pool. Table 2 presents the remaining 7 most frequently 
used choice patterns and the breakdown of subjects following them. For completeness, 
Table 2 also shows how many subjects revealed preference ABCC
3
, although this pattern was 
chosen by less than 1% of the subject pool. The reason is that the pattern ABCC was the only 
intransitive pattern of type ACBA fff  ever selected. 
Table 2 demonstrates that except for group 5 all groups gave qualitatively similar 
responses. Group 5 turned out to be extremely risk averse. The overwhelming majority of the 
subjects chooses apple-tree B in the first situation, around 70% of the subjects choose apple-
tree C in the second situation and apple-tree A in the third situation. Nearly half of the 
subjects prefer apple-tree C in the fourth situation. Around two thirds of the subjects violate 
WARP and more than half of the subjects reveal intransitive preferences of the pattern 
ABCA fff . Only around 1% of the subjects have intransitive preferences for the opposite 
pattern. The most important contribution of the experiment is that we observe a very high 
incidence of intransitive preferences that are also highly asymmetric. 
In all subject groups, except for group 5, we observe the violation of weak stochastic 
transitivity in a sense that more than 50% of the subjects prefer C to B, B to A and A to C.  
Rieskamp et al. (unpublished) argue that the violations of weak stochastic transitivity are 
rarely reported in the literature and that they are mostly explainable by the neglect of just 
perceivable differences. However, in the apple-tree example the differences in probability are 
substantial (at least 33.3%) just like the differences in outcomes (at least 20%). This makes 
the explanation of violation by just noticeable differences hardly convincing. 
                                                 
2 In fact the first pilot experiment contained the description of choice situations with the use of the 
word ‘probability’. For example, apple-tree A was described as the tree giving either 2 apples with 
probability 1/3 or 2 apples with probability 1/3 or 5 apples with probability 1/3. The results from this 
experiment were qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper for situations 1) and 2). 94.7% of 
the subjects have chosen apple-tree B in the first choice situation, 68.4% —apple-tree C in the second 
situation, 52.6% — apple-tree A in the third situation, and 21% of the subjects preferred apple-tree C 
in the fourth situation. 78.9% of the subjects demonstrated a preference reversal (violation of WARP). 
36.8% of the subjects had intransitive preferences of the pattern ABCA fff .  
3 Pattern ABCC corresponds to the choice of apple-tree A in the first situation, choice of apple-tree B 
in the second situation, choice of apple-tree C in the third situation, and choice of apple-tree C in the 
fourth situation. 
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In all subject groups, except for group 5, we observe the violation of weak stochastic 
transitivity in a sense that more than 50% of the subjects prefer C to B, B to A and A to C.  
Rieskamp et al. (unpublished) argue that the violations of weak stochastic transitivity are 
rarely reported in the literature and that they are mostly explainable by the neglect of just 
perceivable differences. However, in the apple-tree example the differences in probability are 
substantial (at least 33.3%) just like the differences in outcomes (at least 20%). This makes 
the explanation of violation by just noticeable differences hardly convincing.  
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Group Population 
Date of 
experiment 
Place of 
experiment 
Language of 
experiment 
Subject age Subject background Method of interviewing 
1 19 14.08.2002 
Prague, Czech 
Republic 
English 20-50 
American, Dutch, German, Russian 
tourists 
Individually, on Charles 
Bridge in Prague downtown 
2 57 11.12.2002 
Dnipropetrovsk, 
Ukraine 
Russian 19 
Undergraduate students majoring in 
physics and technical science 
In class 
3 92 12.12.2002 
Dnipropetrovsk, 
Ukraine 
Russian 20-22 
Undergraduate students majoring in 
finance 
In class 
4 110 12.12.2002 Lviv, Ukraine Ukrainian 17 
Undergraduate students majoring in 
international relations 
In class 
5 70 16.12.2002 Lviv, Ukraine Ukrainian 19 
Undergraduate students majoring in mass 
media 
In class 
6 63 17.12.2002 Lviv, Ukraine Ukrainian 30-60 
Employees of Lviv Bus Plant specialized 
in technical engineering 
During internal seminar 
meeting 
Table 1 The subject pool 
Number of subjects with response pattern Percentage of subjects answering 
Group Population 
ABCC BCAC BCAB BCCB BBAB BBCB ACCC BCCC 1) B 2) C 3) A 4) C 
Violating 
WARP Intransitively 
1 19 0 9 1 5 1 3 0 0 100% 78.9% 57.9% 50% 78.9% 52.6% 
2 57 0 26 10 1 7 5 1 3 94.7% 77.2% 80.7% 54.4% 71.9% 64.9% 
3 92 0 37 13 5 14 10 2 4 95.6% 71.7% 72.8% 47.8% 66.3% 55.4% 
4 110 1 25 18 22 26 9 2 1 92.7% 64.5% 66.4% 27.3% 64.5% 39% 
5 70 2 7 8 2 23 13 5 2 81.4% 38.6% 64.3% 24.3% 31.4% 21.4% 
6 63 0 24 15 4 9 4 1 0 93.6% 71.4% 85.7% 39.7% 76.2% 63.5% 
2+3+6 212 0 87 38 10 30 19 4 7 94.8% 73.6% 78.8% 47.2% 70.8% 60.4% 
   intransitive 
     Violation of WARP 
 
Table 2 The results of the experiment 
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3. Predictions from the Heuristic of Relative Probability 
Comparisons 
Assuming individual non-satiation in apples, let us consider the experimental 
situations: 
Situation 1) An individual decides between apple-tree A and apple-tree B, which is 
equivalent to playing a game against nature. Figure 2.1 shows the “normal form” of 
this game with numbers in the cells standing for the individual’s payoffs. The 
individual knows that nature always plays a mixing strategy assigning 2 apples to 
apple-tree A with probability 2/3 and assigning 5 apples to apple-tree A with 
probability 1/3. According to the heuristic of relative probability comparisons, strategy 
B is preferred because the probability of collecting a larger apple crop while playing B 
(p=2/3) is twice as large as while playing A (p=1/3). In this type of reasoning, the 
cardinal differences in outcomes do not matter. 
Situation 2) The individual chooses between apple-tree B and apple-tree C. Figure 2.2 shows 
the “normal form” of this game. In this case the individual using the heuristic of 
relative probability comparisons plays C because this strategy is more likely to yield a 
higher payoff than the alternative. 
Situation 3) The individual decides between apple-tree A and apple-tree C. Figure 2.3 shows 
the “normal form” of this game. In this case nature plays the following mixing 
strategy: 
a) to assign 2 apples to tree A  and 4 apples to tree C with joint probability 
4/9, 
b) to assign 2 apples to tree A  and 1 apple to tree C with joint probability 2/9, 
c) to assign 5 apples to tree A  and 4 apples to tree C with joint probability 2/9, 
and 
d) to assign 5 apples to tree A  and 1 apple to tree C with joint probability 1/9. 
Figure 2.1 Choosing apple-tree A vs. apple-tree B 
Figure 2.2 Choosing apple-tree B vs. apple-tree C 
     Nature 
         p=2/3              p=1/3 
A 2 ? 
Individual 
B ? 3 
     Nature 
         p=1/3              p=2/3 
B ? 3 
Individual
C 1 ? 
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The individual faces a non-trivial task of choosing between strategy A and 
strategy C because of the increased number of possible outcomes. While 
strategy C gives a higher payoff with probability 4/9 (case a) ), strategy A is 
optimal because it promises a higher yield with cumulative probability 5/9 
(cases b), c) and d) ). 
Situation 4) The individual chooses among three apple-trees: A, B and C. The “normal form” 
of this game is the following (Figure 2.4). Strategy A gives the highest payoff with 
probability 1/3, strategy B yields the largest apple crop with probability 2/9 and 
strategy C promises more apples than the alternatives with probability 4/9. Therefore, 
the individual following the heuristic of relative probability comparisons chooses 
apple-tree C. 
The four choice situations employed in the experiment can be alternatively presented using 
the conventional microeconomic apparatus of indifference curves and choice sets 
(Appendix II). 
 
Notice that the choice pattern of the individual using the heuristic of relative 
probability comparisons is intransitive: B is revealed preferred to A, C is revealed preferred to 
B and A is revealed preferred to C. By comparing choice situations 3) and 4), we also observe 
a violation of WARP. Apple-tree A is revealed preferred to apple-tree C in choice situation 
3). However, apple-tree C is chosen in situation 4) whereas apple-tree A is available in the 
choice set as well. A is revealed preferred to C when the choice set is {A,C} and C is revealed 
preferred to A when the choice set is {A,B,C}. Therefore, the less preferred option was 
chosen as the choice set enlarged, which is a violation of WARP (Arrow 1959). 
In choice situations 1)-3) the response pattern predicted by the heuristic of relative probability 
comparisons was indeed strongly supported by the experimental data. However, in choice 
situation 4) the aggregate percentage of subjects choosing apple-tree C (predicted by the 
heuristic) in groups 4, 5 and 6 is not statistically significantly different from 33.3%—the 
       Nature 
         p=4/9         p=1/9 
         p=2/9   p=2/9 
A 2 ? ? ? 
Individual 
C ? 1 4 1 
       Figure 2.3 Choosing apple-tree A vs. apple-tree C 
             Nature 
                  p=4/9          p=1/9 
              p=2/9   p=2/9 
A 2 2 ? ? 
B 3 ? 3 3 Individual 
C ? 1 4 1 
          Figure 2.4  Choosing among apple-trees A, B and C 
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percentage of subjects choosing apple-tree C if they were indifferent and made a choice 
decision at random. The results suggest that maybe the heuristic of relative probability 
comparisons is employed in binary choice but fewer subjects use it when faced with choice 
among three or more lotteries (effect of cognitive constraint). A possible explanation could be 
the complexity of probability evaluation—subjects tend to choose the tree yielding sure apple 
crop when the evaluation of relative probabilities becomes cumbersome (as in the case when 
there are three or more lotteries). If this explanation is valid the increase of incentives should 
motivate the subjects to invest more effort in choice situation 4) and employ the heuristic of 
relative probability comparisons.  
The pattern of intransitive preferences revealed in choice situations 1)-3) is similar to a 
well-known preference reversal phenomenon (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971). Apple-tree A 
gives a sure chance to collect a good but not very high apple crop (either 2 or 5 apples). 
Subjects can subconsciously associate apple-tree A with a ‘probability’ lottery (P bet) 
yielding an almost certain modest payoff.  Apple-tree B yields some chance to collect a high 
apple crop (4 apples), but also it might bring an intolerably low (in fact minimum) apple crop 
of 1. Therefore, subjects can subconsciously associate apple-tree B with a ‘dollar’ lottery ($ 
bet) yielding a high but unsure payoff. In a direct binary choice (third situation) P bet is 
revealed preferred to $ bet. However, in the first choice situation the individual reveals that P 
bet is worth less than 3 apples for sure, which is the promised apple-crop of apple-tree B. In 
the second choice situation the $ bet is valued more than 3 apples since the individual is not 
willing to give up apple-tree C for as low as 3 apples (to choose apple-tree B). If we interpret 
choice situations 1) and 2) as one-stage matching (Loomes and Sugden 1983), we observe the 
failure of procedure invariance: P bet is preferred to $ bet in a direct binary choice but $ bet is 
revealed to be worth more than the P bet in one-stage matching.  
Brandstätter et al. (2002) make appeal to a psychological notion of elation and 
disappointment in choice under risk. This approach is in contrast to this study, which 
advocates the binary comparison of lotteries during the evaluation stage in the spirit of regret 
theory. Brandstätter et al. (2002) argue that people like small chances to win a lot due to the 
expected elation from a highly unlikely gain (attractiveness of apple-tree A) and that people 
dislike high chances to win less because the unlikely loss is disappointing (unattractiveness of 
apple-tree C). The experimental results from choice situations 1) and 2) do not support 
Brandstätter’s et al. (2002) conjecture. 
 
4. General Discussion 
4.1 Experimental procedure 
 
The experimental results reported here confirm the pervasive use of the heuristic of 
relative probability comparisons in choice under risk. This heuristic assumes that an 
individual addresses a risky choice decision in the following manner. For all possible states of 
the world all dominated outcomes of a lottery are eliminated. Then an individual selects the 
option for which the remaining states of the world accumulate the larger probability.  
The heuristic of relative probability comparisons focuses on differences in the 
probability of various feasible lotteries to yield the highest realized outcome. For the 
estimation of the likelihood of a lottery to bring the highest ex post outcome, the exact 
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numerical differences in realized outcomes are not important. In other words, the heuristic is 
ordinal in outcomes. For example, if we modify the apple-tree A so that it now yields 50 
apples with probability 1/3 and 2 apples with probability 2/3, the predictions from the 
heuristic do not change. However, the pattern of subjects’ choices is likely to change. This 
example highlights the bounds of applicability of the heuristic of relative probability 
comparisons—the heuristic performs well when the expected values of lotteries are equal but 
it breaks down when there are substantial differences in expected lottery outcomes. The 
results of the apple-tree experiment are straightforwardly extendable to the situations when 
expected lottery outcomes are similar but not equal. However, there is clearly a limit to this 
generalization. 
In the apple-tree experiment the subjects were presented with hypothetical risky 
choice problems although the degree of abstraction was minimal and the problems resembled 
to a great extent a real life choice situation. Kühberger et al. (2002) argue that the use of 
hypothetical payoffs generally does not endanger the validity of experimental results. 
Nevertheless, there are numerous counterexamples where the use of real outcomes affects the 
choice decision (e.g., (Hertwig and Ortmann 2001) for a recent survey). Although I do not 
believe that the replication of the apple-tree experiment with real payoffs is likely to generate 
different results I fully acknowledge this possibility. 
In the apple-tree experiment the subjects faced the choice problems in a frequency 
format that made probability information salient. However, this frequency format also makes 
year-by-year crop comparisons more explicit and it is possible to argue that a time ordering of 
crops induces the use of the heuristic of relative probability comparisons. I also acknowledge 
that the particular frequency presentation of lotteries used in the experiment bears some 
elements of a multi-attribute choice. Although the interpretation of experimental results in 
terms of risk attitude is the most natural and straightforward explanation, the subjects might 
be guided by other reasons as well in their choices. The observed paradox may have 
implications on general multi-attribute utility theory instead of decision theory.   
Ortmann and Gigerenzer (1997) argue that the pioneering discovery of contextual 
effects in psychology has a direct effect on experimental economics. Subjects may seem to 
make irrational decisions in abstract context, which are nevertheless reasonable from some 
particular point of view (presumably brought to laboratory from real life). Thus, in the apple-
tree experiment the choice situations are presented in a less abstract manner through a simple 
real-life example—planting an apple-tree with risky future crop. The introduction of a specific 
context to risky choice situations leaves less freedom for the subjects in choosing their own 
decision frame. 
4.2. Parallels in social choice 
 
The notion of content-independent preference in individual choice parallels the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom in public choice. Kalai and Smorodinsky 
(1975) argued that the IIA axiom does not necessarily hold and suggested an alternative 
solution to the Nash bargaining problem that depends on the availability of irrelevant 
alternatives. Similarly, in individual choice with content-dependent preferences the change in 
the menu of available inferior alternatives can influence the choice of the most preferred 
option. Kalai et al. (2002) give a number of real-life choice procedures violating IIA that can 
be rationalized by several preference orderings each applicable to a different set of choice 
problems.  
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One convenient way of thinking about the heuristic of relative probability 
comparisons is the following. An individual looks back at the past history of outcome 
realizations of various feasible lotteries and counts which lottery gave the highest outcome in 
the majority of past periods. The heuristic of relative probability comparisons is thus related 
to the majority rule in social choice (Bar-Hillel and Margalit 1988). 
4.3. Content-induced preference reversal 
 
In the case of content-dependent preference an individual choice between two 
particular alternatives depends on the other options available in the choice set that might be 
potentially chosen as well. Therefore, almost by definition content-dependent preference 
always violates WARP and also its stronger (SARP) and weaker forms (acyclic rationality as 
defined by Bandyopadhyay and Sengupta 1991). By adding more elements to the initial two-
element choice set, we detect content-dependent preferences whenever WARP is violated. 
Starmer (2000) noticed that intransitive preference theory has to allow for 
comparisons between choice options unlike the conventional microeconomic theory with a 
single-argument utility function. Loomes and Sugden (1982) introduced regret theory to 
justify intransitive behavior by means of retrospective preference. The feeling of 
regret/rejoicing is only one particular set of reasons that might induce the individual to 
evaluate choice options relatively to the other (foregone) elements of the choice set. The 
notion of content-dependent preference allows for this comparison in a more general setting. 
Simonson and Tversky (1992) showed that inclusion of a low quality pen into the 
choice set already consisting of a high quality pen and a fixed amount of cash induces more 
people to choose a high quality pen as opposed to monetary payoff. The literature on the 
asymmetric dominance effect and the attraction effect documented that the experimental 
manipulation of the choice set results in contextually induced preference reversals. The 
introduction of an asymmetrically dominated alternative (that is dominated by one choice 
option but not the other) is inducing preference for the dominant option. The phenomenon 
persists even when the added (decoy) option is not strictly dominated by any of the initial 
choice alternatives (attraction effect). Wedell (1991) experimentally confirmed the existence 
of a significant asymmetric dominance effect in choice under risk. More generally, the 
addition of a new choice option, putting the already available choice option in a more 
favorable light, reinforces the individual’s preference for this ‘attractive’ option.  
However, Chu and Chu (1990) showed that the incidence of preference reversals is 
lower  
a) in a market-like environment, where reversals are confronted with repeated 
arbitrage transactions causing them to lose money, and 
b) with subjects having had already the experience of market-like environment. 
Similarly, Cox and Grether (1996) argue that repetitive market environments with 
feedback mechanisms reduce the rate of preference reversals and the asymmetry between 
predicted and unpredicted reversals. Nevertheless, intransitive preference may persist, for 
example, in individual consumer problems, where the market feedback is low. Mitchell 
(1912) argued that the markets do not provide a satisfactory feedback to the purchasers of 
goods and services. The consumer “cannot even make objectively valid comparisons between 
the various gratifications which she may secure for ten dollars”. Subjective experiences of 
various purchases of different individuals are only roughly comparable and this limits the 
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effectiveness of any feedback mechanism in consumer problems. But it is feedback rather 
than repetition, which is responsible for the elimination of intransitive preferences. Humphrey 
(2001) found that intransitive preferences do not disappear when the choice triple is repeated 
for the second time. The consumer faces repetitive tasks but the feedback is low and, thus, 
intransitive preferences can easily persist. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper demonstrates that individual decision making under risk is sometimes done 
in a fundamentally different way than the neoclassical microeconomic theory assumes. 
Individual preferences are not absolute – binary preference relation between two choice 
options can be contingent on the choice set that the options are drawn from. In choice under 
risk such content-dependent preference is possible when individuals first estimate the ex ante 
probability of each lottery to give a higher ex post payoff than any other feasible lottery and 
then choose the lottery with the highest such probability. This heuristic of relative probability 
comparisons obviously leads to the content-dependent preferences since the likelihood that a 
particular lottery outperforms all others depends on the payoff distributions of available 
alternatives.  
The heuristic is ordinal in outcomes and, thus, it is applicable in choice situations 
where only ordinal information about lottery outcomes is available. Interestingly, the 
experimental evidence in this paper shows that individuals may choose to process information 
about lottery outcomes in an ordinal way even when cardinal information is available. This 
human strive for simplicity in decision-making supports the proposed heuristic in many 
choice situations.  
In a binary choice between lotteries with equal expected value the overwhelming 
majority of the subjects employs the heuristic of relative probability comparisons, especially 
when the lotteries are presented so that probability information is made salient (e.g., 
frequency format). The experimental results demonstrate that the rational individual 
preferences may be intransitive if they are aggregated over different choice sets (around 55% 
of the subjects make intransitive choices), WARP does not hold and the inclusion or 
exclusion of irrelevant alternatives can influence the choice (around 65% of the subjects 
violate WARP). 
This paper clearly illustrates that at least in some choice situations under risk the 
overwhelming majority of individuals uses the heuristic of relative probability comparisons 
resulting in intransitive choice and violation of standard consistency requirements such as 
WARP. It is left for future empirical research to determine whether the heuristic of relative 
probability comparisons is also employed in choice under uncertainty. Further extension of 
this work would be the empirical investigation whether the heuristic of relative probability 
comparisons is used when the lotteries differ in expected outcomes and what are the bounds 
of its applicability in general. It is also left for future research to investigate the dependence of 
the heuristic or relative probability comparisons on the frequentistic format of lottery 
presentation.  
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Appendix I 
Experiment on decision-making 
Suppose that you like apples (“the more apples the better”) and you consider the possibility of planting an apple-tree in 
your family garden. Now please answer the following questions. 
Situation 1) 
If you were asked to choose between apple-tree A and apple-tree B, what would you prefer? For your reference, please 
find below the history of apple crops of apple-tree A and apple-tree B over the last nine years: 
Apple-tree A 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
     
 
Apple-tree B 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
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Situation 2) 
If you were asked to choose between apple-tree B and apple-tree C, what would you prefer? For your reference, please 
find below the history of apple crops of apple-tree B and apple-tree C over the last nine years: 
Apple-tree B 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
   
Apple-tree C 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
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Situation 3) 
If you were asked to choose between apple-tree A and apple-tree C, what would you prefer? For your reference, please 
find below the history of apple crops of apple-tree A and apple-tree C over the last nine years: 
Apple-tree A 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
     
Apple-tree C 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
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Situation 4) 
If you were asked to choose among apple-tree A, apple-tree B and apple-tree C, what would you prefer? For your reference, please find below 
the history of apple crops of apple-tree A, apple-tree B and apple-tree C over the last nine years: 
Apple-tree A 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
     
Apple-tree B 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
   
Apple-tree C 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Apple 
crop 
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Appendix II 
The apple-tree example can be conveniently represented by the conventional 
microeconomic apparatus of indifference curves and choice sets. All three apple-trees 
are points on a two-dimensional plane, where the horizontal axis measures how many 
apples the tree yields with probability 2/3 and the vertical axis shows the apple crop of 
each tree, which is collected with probability 1/3. In other words, apple-tree A 
corresponds to point A(2;5), apple-tree B is represented by point B(3;3) situated on 45° 
certainty line and apple-tree C is plotted as point C(4;1). The pattern of the indifference 
curves consistent with the choice functions revealed in the situations 1)-4) is presented 
in Figure 5.  
In choice situation 1) apple-tree B lays on a higher indifference curve than 
apple-tree A and at the same time in situation 2) apple-tree C is situated on a higher 
indifference curve than B. However, in the third choice situation apple-tree C is situated 
on a lower indifference curve than apple-tree A, which demonstrates that individual 
preferences can change as the choice set changes, i.e., preferences are content-
dependent. If the preferences were content-independent, the indifference curves would 
not intersect when we combine all sections of Figure 5 together on one graph. 
Additionally, the knowledge of the pattern of indifference curves revealed in choice 
situations 1)-3) does not help to predict the pattern of indifference curves in situation 4), 
although the choice set in situation 4) is the union of choice sets in situations 1)-3). 
Finally, in choice situation 1) and possibly 3) the family of indifference curves is 
convex (risk aversion) whereas in choice situation 2), 4) and possibly 3) the indifference 
curves are concave (risk love). 
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Figure 5 Indifference curves consistent with revealed choice functions in each situation 
